Introduction
Incentive compatible mechanisms are pervasive in microeconomic models in which agents have private information. If there exists a relevant set of outcomes X, which does not depend on the agents' information, a (direct, deterministic) mechanism ξ can be defined as a mapping from the set of states of nature (or agents' types) T into X. Such a mechanism ξ induces a revelation game Γ(ξ), in which every agent is invited to report his information; ξ is called (Bayesian) incentive compatible if truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(ξ). The interest in incentive compatible mechanisms is justified by the well-known revelation principle. Suppose we consider any Nash equilibrium of a more general communication game, in which every agent sends a message in an arbitrary set and a planner chooses an outcome in X as a function of the message profile. Then the mapping, from T to X, induced by the agents' strategies and the planner's choice function is an incentive compatible mechanism.
The previous approach has been widely applied in exchange economies with differential information in which initial endowments are (at least in the aggregate) independent of agents' types (see, e.g., [3] , [4] , [13] , [15] , [17] , [19] ). In the more general situation where every agent privately knows his own endowment, allocating goods on the basis of the agents' reports can obviously lead to bankruptcy problems. It is natural to consider allocation games in which the agents not only send messages depending on their types (cheap talk) but also make deposits of consumption goods. This procedure solves both individual and joint feasibility constraints: the agent cannot deposit more than what he possesses and the planner can only allocate what has been put on the table.
Our first goal in this paper is to define precisely appropriate allocation games and to derive direct mechanisms, following the tradition of the revelation principle. Since the deposits that an agent is able to make depend on his privately known endowment, types are partially verifiable in allocation games. While this property sometimes impedes specific forms of the revelation principle, as shown by Green and Laffont (1986) , it will on the contrary facilitate the fulfillment of incentive constraints in our framework, since agents cannot pretend to be richer than they are.
Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995) and Postlewaite (1979) proposed two classes of (direct) mechanisms in exchange economies with typedependent initial endowments. They pointed out that agents, when invited to report their endowments, can be asked to put these on the table, so that they cannot over-report them. In W-(for "withholding") mechanisms, the agent can consume any part of his endowment that he conceals. In D-(for "destroying") mechanisms, any part of the endowment that is not displayed is lost. The latter class of mechanisms makes sense if the agents' initial endowments must be checked by some authority before being consumed 1 . Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995) focused on Nash implementation, without asymmetric information between the agents and thus did not investigate Bayesian incentive compatibility. They defined direct mechanisms without detailing the revelation principle behind them. Being not interested in incentive compatibility conditions, they did not use the fact that their mechanisms would make types partially verifiable.
Hong ([9] , [10] , see also [11] ) studied Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets. She did not address the question of the revelation principle and concentrated on a specific class of direct mechanisms, which, in the particular case of exchange economies with type-dependent endowments, allow the agents to withhold part of their endowment as the W-mechanisms of Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995) . Furthermore, Hong's mechanisms recognize the a priori restrictions that the underlying Bayesian model imposes on the possible deposits. The associated Bayesian incentive compatibility conditions reflect the partial verifiability of types.
Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002) considered W-mechanisms in T.U. exchange economies with asymmetric information, in which unlimited money transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. By relying on an appropriate version of the revelation principle, they focused on simple, direct W-mechanisms. They established positive results on the non-emptiness of the ex ante incentive compatible core, which illustrate that asking the agents to deposit their initial endowment indeed facilitates incentive compatibility requirements.
In this paper, we define rigorously W-and D-allocation games for exchange economies with asymmetric information and type-dependent initial endowments. We show that the same direct mechanisms can be used in both frameworks, and capture Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995)'s concepts through the W-or D-incentive compatibility of these direct mechanisms. More precisely, we show (in propositions 1 and 6) that the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs of all W-(resp., D-) allocation game coincides with the set of payoffs to W-(resp., D-) incentive compatible direct mechanisms.
This representation result can be interpreted as a general revelation principle, but is not completely standard. For W-incentive compatible mechanisms in N.T.U. economies, it requires that we consider a large class of Wallocation games, in which agents can be forced to make a minimal deposit. If one focuses on W-allocation games with unrestricted deposits, the set of associated Nash equilibrium payoffs coincides with the set of payoffs to interim individually rational W-incentive compatible mechanisms (see proposition 3). This property, which is consistent with Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995)'s results on Nash implementation, is typical of W-allocation games (proposition 6) in N.T.U. economies (proposition 2).
The previous paragraph suggests that choosing between W-and D-incentive compatible mechanisms might be delicate. Before elaborating on this question, let us point out that the problem can only arise in N.T.U. economies. We indeed prove (proposition 7) that in the T.U. case, W-and D-incentive compatible mechanisms are equivalent (in the sense that they both generate the same ex ante expected payoffs). In particular, except in section 6.2, Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002) could as well have considered D-mechanisms.
All difficulties are also apparently avoided in the particular case of typeindependent endowments: again, W-and D-incentive compatible mechanisms are equivalent and correspond to the mechanisms that have been used in the literature (see, among others, [3] , [4] , [13] ). However, W-and D-incentive compatible mechanisms are direct mechanisms, and as mentioned above, they cannot be justified by the same revelation principle. If we think that W-allocation games with unrestricted deposits are appropriate when endowments are type-dependent, we should also use them in the limit case where endowments are type-independent, but then we must focus on interim individually rational mechanisms. In section 4, we illustrate the difficulties in economies with non-exclusive information (introduced by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) ).
Several articles (e.g., Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), Serrano and Vohra (2001) ) consider a slightly more general framework than type-independent endowments, but keep a set of feasible allocations that is independent of the state of nature, by assuming constant aggregate endowment. In this approach, the mechanism designer is allowed to re-allocate (with free disposal) the constant aggregate endowment what-ever the reports of the agents. We show, in section 6, that this amounts to considering D-incentive compatible mechanisms, but is inconsistent with W-incentive compatible mechanisms.
Basic economy
We consider a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information described by the following ingredients:
n agents: i = 1, ..., n l consumption goods: j = 1, ..., l T i : finite set of types of agent i, T = 1≤i≤n T i , q ∈ ∆(T ): probability distribution over T e i (t i ) ∈ R l + : agent i's (initial) endowment, depending only on his own type t i , thus measurable w.r.t. the agent's information. In the T.U. case, there is an additional good, money. Agents do not have any initial endowment in money. Utility functions are quasi-linear, namely take the form:
The decisions to be made by the agents, the timing of information and actions, etc. will be detailed in the next section.
W-mechanisms and the revelation principle
A W-allocation game for the previous economy is played with the help of a planner. Such a game is described as follows:
• A chance move selects t = (t i ) 1≤i≤n ∈ T according to q; agent i is informed of t i and endowed with e i (t i ).
• Every agent i sends a (cheap talk) message c i ∈ C i to the planner, and makes a deposit
The agents make their decisions simultaneously; let c = (c i ) 1≤i≤n and d = (d i ) 1≤i≤n .
• Given (c, d), the planner selects, possibly at random, an allocation
• Agent i receives the payoff
The sets C i and D i are part of the description of the allocation game. More precisely, the parameters of the allocation game are the sets C i , D i , i = 1, ..., n and the transition probability 2 used by the planner to choose an allocation (and possibly, monetary transfers) as a function of the agents' messages and deposits. We will sometimes refer to the latter as the "planner's (mixed) strategy", even if the planner is not a player of the allocation game.
D i is interpreted as a list of allowed deposits, which is fixed by the game. We assume that every agent is able to make a deposit, whatever his type, namely that the sets D i satisfy
In other words, the set of possible deposits for agent i of type t i , namely
is non-empty, for every i, t i . Of course, the condition is satisfied as soon as 0 ∈ D i . As typical examples of possible sets of deposits, one can take
The latter set is the most restrictive one. We say that deposits are unrestricted if D i = R l + . We will first consider all possible sets of deposits D i that satisfy (1) . We will thereafter turn to W-allocation games with unrestricted deposits.
In a W-allocation game, individual and joint feasibility constraints are automatically satisfied, even outside of equilibrium, since they are explicitly materialized. Agents possibly withhold part of their endowment (namely, e i (t i ) − d i ), which they can consume (this is typical of W-allocation games, as opposed to D-allocation games, see below)
3 . Observe that the players of the allocation game are not asked (neither ex ante, nor at the interim stage) whether they want to participate in the game or not, but for some specification of the game, some moves in C i × D i could be interpreted as "no participation".
Even if D i is specified independently of agent i's type (which the planner does not know), the set of possible deposits for agent i of type t i is D i (t i ), which depends on t i through e i (t i ). Hence, types are partially verifiable in the allocation game (see, e.g., Green and Laffont (1986), Forges and Koessler (2003) ).
We will propose a canonical representation of all Nash equilibrium outcomes of W-allocation games. For this, we introduce simple revelation games Γ(ξ) induced by a mechanism ξ, which will be defined formally below. In Γ(ξ), agent i of type t i must make a report in the following subset of T i :
In other words, it is implicit that agent i of type t i must show the endowment e i (a i ) corresponding to his reported type a i . Hence, he cannot claim that he is richer than he really is, but can nevertheless withhold part of his endowment by pretending to be poorer than he is.
A mechanism ξ can now be defined as a mapping which associates with every type profile t ∈ T a probability distribution ξ(.|t) over
The revelation game Γ(ξ) induced by ξ starts with the move of nature selecting types. Then every agent i of type t i makes a report in R i (t i ) and ξ selects an allocation x. As usual, we will say ξ is incentive compatible if truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(ξ). We thus compute the expected utility of agent i of type t i when reporting a i ∈ R i (t i ):
We refer to these as W-expected utilities. Let us set
Similar conditions can be given in the T.U. case. A mechanism is then a pair (ξ, µ) where ξ is as above and µ is a mapping from T into R n such that 1≤i≤n µ i (t) ≤ 0 for every t. Indeed, as noted in Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002), one can restrict on deterministic money transfers w.l.o.g. Let us set
and
(ξ, µ) is W-I.C. iff
The revelation principle for W-allocation games can be stated as follows 4 Proposition 1 In both N.T.U. and T.U. economies, the set of all interim expected payoffs that can be achieved at a Nash equilibrium of some W-allocation game coincides with the set of interim expected payoffs to W-I.C. mechanisms.
The proof relies on standard arguments and will be sketched below. Before that, let us point out that some care is needed to get the result in the N.T.U. case. Proposition 1 not only states that every equilibrium of a W-allocation game can be achieved by means of a W-I.C. mechanism but that the converse also holds. That is to say, one does not add new payoffs by considering W-I.C. mechanisms. This direction, which holds trivially in standard applications of the revelation principle, is obviously crucial for welfare purposes. In order to get a full equivalence between equilibria of W-allocation games and W-I.C. mechanisms, one has to allow for W-allocation games in which the sets of deposits D i can be quite restrictive, as we did above.
Let us illustrate the problem with a simple example. Assume l = 2, agent 1 has two possible types s and t, e 1 (s) = (1, 0), e 1 (t) = (0, 1) and consider an allocation game such that
Suppose that the planner selects an allocation such that x 1 = (0, 0) whatever agent 1 says and deposits. Of course, at any equilibrium of the allocation game, agent 1 withholds his endowment (which is feasible with the above set D 1 ). But in a simple revelation game, agent 1 can either claim type s and deposit 1 unit of the first good or claim type t and deposit 1 unit of the second good. Hence he is forced to reveal his type. As a consequence, (0, 0) can be allocated to agent 1. The revelation game corresponds to a W-allocation game in which
Sketch of the proof of proposition 1
The proof is similar to the one of theorem 3 in Forges and Koessler (2003) . Let us call a W-allocation game canonical if C i is (a copy of) agent i's set of types T i and if D i is agent i's list of possible initial endowments {e i (t i ), t i ∈ T i }, i = 1, ..., n. A canonical W-allocation game is thus entirely described by the strategy of the planner: all the other parameters of the game are fixed by the underlying economy. In a canonical W-allocation game, a canonical strategy of player i consists of revealing his true type t i and of depositing the corresponding initial endowment e i (t i ). By proceeding as in the standard revelation principle, one shows that the set of all interim expected payoffs that can be achieved at a Nash equilibrium of a W-allocation game coincides with the set of interim expected payoffs to canonical Nash equilibria (of canonical W-allocation games).
The previous canonical representation can be further simplified. Agent i can just be asked to report a type a i , with the understanding that he has to deposit e i (a i ) when he claims to be of type a i . Every canonical equilibrium yields a distribution over outcomes as a function of types that can be viewed as a W-I.C. mechanism (with the same interim payoffs). Conversely, a W-I.C. mechanism generates a canonical equilibrium by treating any report of the form (a i
Q.E.D.
As implicit in Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002), in T.U. economies, proposition 1 holds even if one allows only for W-allocation games with unrestricted deposits, in which any amount of collateral is allowed a priori. The reason is simple: in a T.U. economy with free disposal of money, the planner can always decide to impose a large negative money transfer to any agent whose deposit does not belong to some prevailing list. Hence, one can restrict D i to a minimal set, w.l.o.g. We thus have Proposition 2 In T.U. economies, the set of all interim expected payoffs that can be achieved at a Nash equilibrium of some W-allocation game with unrestricted deposits coincides with the set of interim expected payoffs to W-I.C. mechanisms.
One may argue that the W-allocation games with unrestricted deposits are the natural ones: agents face liquidity constraints depending on their initial endowments but do not have to place some minimal amount of consumption goods on the table. The next proposition characterizes the interim expected payoffs that can be achieved by means of such allocation games in the N.T.U. case.
Let α i (t i ) denote the interim individually rational level of agent i of type
A profile of interim payoffs is interim individually rational if every agent i gets at least his interim individually rational level α i (t i ) for every type t i . In particular, a mechanism ξ is interim individually rational (int.I.R.) if
Proposition 3 In N.T.U. economies, the set of all interim expected payoffs that can be achieved at a Nash equilibrium of some W-allocation game with unrestricted deposits coincides with the set of interim expected payoffs to int.I.R. W-I.C. mechanisms.
Sketch of the proof of proposition 3
Starting from a Nash equilibrium of a W-allocation game with unrestricted deposits one constructs a W-I.C. mechanism with the same interim expected payoffs by proceeding as in the proof of proposition 1. Since every agent can always withhold his full initial endowment in the allocation game, these payoffs are necessarily int.I.R.
Consider now an individually rational W-I.C. mechanism. We have seen in the proof of proposition 1 that it induces a canonical equilibrium in a canonical W-allocation game, in which agent i makes reports in T i × {e i (t i ), t i ∈ T i }. The canonical equilibrium can be retained as an equilibrium even in a game with unrestricted deposits provided agent i gets 0 whenever he makes a report of the form (a i , d i ) with d i / ∈ {e i (t i ), t i ∈ T i }. Agent i will not benefit from such a deviation since his original payoff is int.I.R.
Let us close this section by investigating the W-allocation games in the (extensively studied) N.T.U. case with type-independent endowments, i.e., e i (t i ) = e i for every i and t i ∈ T i . Types are then completely unverifiable, and the standard approach is to define allocation games without any deposit requirement: the agents just send a cheap talk message at the second stage of the game, and the planner selects an allocation in
with the understanding that he knows the type-independent initial endowments. If one starts with such allocation games (without deposits), the standard revelation principle leads us to incentive compatible mechanisms ξ satisfying the W-I.C. conditions (5), with of course, e i (t i ) = e i (a i ) = e i for all t i , a i and R i (t i ) = T i . These are exactly the conditions imposed in, e.g., We thus recover the traditional I.C. mechanisms when we apply Wallocation games to environments with type-independent endowments if, as proposed above, we consider a large class of possible sets of deposits in the W-allocation games. For instance, a set of deposits of the form D i = {d i ∈ R l + : d i ≥ min t i ∈T i e i (t i )} forces agent i to deposit his constant endowment. However, focusing on D i = R l + for every i leads to int.I.R. mechanisms. To summarize this section: with allocation games allowing for all D i 's satisfying (1), the revelation principle justifies that we use W-I.C. mechanisms, both in N.T.U. and T.U. economies. However, if we focus on allocation games with unrestricted deposits, we give the agents the opportunity of not participating in the game at the interim stage and thus generate only int.I.R. payoffs in the N.T.U. case.
W-mechanisms and non-exclusive information
In this section, we study the effects of W-mechanisms in the N.T.U. economies with non-exclusive information (N.E.I.) introduced by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986). Recall that N.E.I. means that ∀t ∈ T : q(t) > 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n q(t i |t −i ) = 1
This condition is known to imply that any allocation can be made incentive compatible. Let us illustrate that if endowments depend on types, and incentive compatibility is interpreted as W-incentive compatibility, such a property does not hold.
Example: Consider two agents 1 and 2, a single good (l = 1), and two equiprobable states of nature ω 1 and ω 2 . At ω 1 , agent 1 is rich and agent 2 is poor. At ω 2 , it is the reverse. Information is complete at the interim stage: both agents observe the state of nature (hence N.E.I. obviously holds). This fits in the basic model by taking
, q(ω 2 ) = 2. The utility functions are the same for both agents and do not depend on types: v i (t, x) = √ x, for every t ∈ T and every x ∈ R + .
Consider the "full insurance allocation" allocating 1 unit of good to each agent in each state. It looks like a reasonable ex ante allocation. But it cannot be achieved as an equilibrium outcome of a W-allocation game as defined in the previous section. Indeed, suppose agent 1 is rich (state ω 1 ). He should deposit his 2 units in order to give 1 to agent 2. If he pretends to be poor (i.e., of type ω 2 1 ) and deposits nothing, he consumes his 2 units, which is better than 1. Of course, if agent 2 reveals truthfully his type, the planner sees that one of the agents has lied, since a state of zero probability has been reported. But he cannot figure out which agent has cheated, and there is nothing to be confiscated on the table.
In this example, even allowing for the large class of W-allocation games introduced above, incentive compatibility implies interim individual rationality. We go on by recalling well-known results which show that the crucial features of the example are: N.T.U. economy, type-dependent endowments and allocation that is not int.I.R.
The key to the use of non-exclusive information is the existence of a "worst outcome": if a state of zero probability is reported, than the planner punishes all agents by selecting the worst outcome. In the T.U. case, with free disposal of money, a worst outcome is easily constructed. For int.I.R. mechanisms, one can establish the following result:
Proposition 4 Under non-exclusive information, for every int.I.R. mechanism ξ, there exists a W-I.C. mechanism ξ achieving the same interim expected payoffs as ξ.
The proof is similar to the one of lemma 3.1 in Vohra (1999), but, since Vohra does not consider W-allocation games 5 , we briefly recall the argument. Define ξ by: ξ (.|t) = ξ(.|t) if q(t) > 0, ξ ((e i (t i )) 1≤i≤n |t) = 1 if q(t) = 0. The interpretation of the latter is that if the agents' reports are inconsistent, the planner returns to every agent i the endowment e i (t i ) corresponding to his claimed type t i (i.e., the deposit which is on table). If agent i of type t i reveals his true type t i , he gets at least his interim I.R. level α i (t i ) (recall (9)). If he claims to be of type a i = t i , e i (a i ) ≤ e i (t i ), for every truthful report t −i of the other agents, q(a i , t −i ) = 0, so that agent i gets e i (t i ) (= e i (t i ) − e i (a i ) + e i (a i )). By lying, he cannot expect more than α i (t i ).
6
The following result is also easily established:
5 See remark 2, section 7.
Proposition 5 If endowments do not depend on types and information is non-exclusive, for every mechanism ξ, there exists a W-I.C. mechanism ξ achieving the same interim expected payoffs as ξ.
The proof is similar as above, provided that one adopts the variant in the footnote: nothing guarantees here that ξ is int.I.R. (observe that ξ does not have to be ex ante I.R.). When endowments do not depend on types, they can be confiscated, which determines a "worst outcome"
7 .
Obviously, the analysis is extremely sensitive to the details of the Wallocation game. We may imagine a number of scenarios, e.g., inspired by recent contract theory, that would allow the planner to check the agents' endowments in some circumstances. We will just stick to the general equilibrium literature, and consider, in the next section, the D-mechanisms used by Postlewaite (1979) , Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995) , and implicitly, all the papers assuming constant aggregate endowment.
D-mechanisms
The only difference between a D-allocation game and a W-allocation game is that agents cannot consume any part of their endowment that they do not put on the table. In other words, they can destroy some of their endowment, but cannot withhold anything. A D-allocation game can thus be defined exactly as a W-allocation game, except for the last stage, which becomes:
Canonical D-allocation games and canonical equilibria can be defined in the same way as in section 3. In particular, we can characterize them by means of the same mechanisms ξ as above. The expected utility of agent i of type t i when reporting a i ∈ R i (t i ) becomes now, in the N.T.U. case,
and in the T.U. case,
We refer to these expressions as D-expected utilities. By proceeding in a similar way as in section 3 and recalling (3) and (4), we get in the N.T.U. case
and similarly, in the T.U. case, recalling (6) and (7),
D-expected utilities and W-expected utilities thus coincide at equilibrium. D-incentive compatibility can be defined as in (5) and (8) . In the N.T.U. case,
A revelation principle as in proposition 2 (with full freedom to the agents, namely, D i = R l + , i = 1, ..., n) holds for D-I.C. mechanisms, even in the N.T.U. case.
Proposition 6
In both N.T.U. and T.U. economies, the set of all interim expected payoffs that can be achieved at a Nash equilibrium of some D-allocation game with unrestricted deposits coincides with the set of interim expected payoffs to D-I.C. mechanisms.
Obviously, an analog of proposition 1 also holds. To see that we need not consider all possible sets of deposits when withholding is not possible, consider a Nash equilibrium of some D-allocation game, with sets of deposits D i . We can get the same expected payoffs at an equilibrium of a D-allocation game with unrestricted deposits by allocating the bundle x i = 0 to agent i whenever his deposit is in R l + \D i and proceeding as in the original game otherwise.
We now investigate the relationships between W-I.C. and D-I.C. mechanisms. Consider a W-I.C. mechanism ξ in an N.T.U. economy. ξ can be used in a D-allocation game. Since utility functions are increasing, we have for every t i , a i such that e i (t i ) − e i (a i ) ≥ 0,
Hence, every W-I.C. mechanism ξ is automatically D-I.C. This property obviously holds in the T.U. case as well. This immediately implies the first part of the next proposition: Proposition 7 In both N.T.U. and T.U. economies, the set of interim expected payoffs to W-I.C. mechanisms is included in the set of interim expected payoffs to D-I.C. mechanisms. In T.U. economies, for every D-I.C. mechanism (ξ, µ), there exists a W-I.C. mechanism (ξ, µ ) achieving the same aggregate ex ante expected payoff as (ξ, µ).
Before proving the second part of the statement, we illustrate that the inclusion in the first part may be strict by going back to the example at the end of the previous section.
The "full insurance allocation" allocating 1 unit of good to each agent in each state can be achieved by a D-I.C. mechanism. Indeed, let us allocate goods as follows, as a function of the agents' reports (and corresponding deposits):
The mechanism is feasible: if the agents report (ω 1 1 , ω 1 2 ), agent 1 puts 2 units of good on the table, 1 unit of which can be given to agent 2 (who deposits nothing), etc. The mechanism also satisfies the I.C. conditions (12) . When poor, agent 1 has no way to misrepresent his type. If he is rich, he can pretend to be poor, but, given that agent 2 tells the truth, this results in a reported state of zero probability, and agent 1 gets nothing (since in the present model, he cannot consume his 2 units if he does not put them on the table). If he tells the truth, he keeps 1 unit, which is better than nothing.
Proof of the second part of proposition 7 (equivalence of D-I.C. mechanisms and W-I.C. mechanisms in the T.U. case) Let (ξ, µ) be a D-I.C. mechanism. The aggregate ex ante (W-or D-) expected payoff from (ξ, µ) is
We first construct monetary transfers λ such that (ξ, µ + λ) is W-I.C., namely satisfies (8) .
Define, for every i and t i ∈ T i ,
Let us show that (ξ, µ + λ) is W-incentive compatible. Consider agent i of type t i . By telling the truth (and thus depositing e i (t i )), he gets
This agent contemplates to report a i ∈ R i (t i ), i.e., to deposit e i (a i ) and withhold e i (t i ) − e i (a i ) ≥ 0. Suppose first that e i (a i ) = e i (t i ). Then λ i (a i ) = λ i (t i ) and U i (ξ, µ|t i , a i ) = U i (ξ, µ|t i , a i ). Hence the W-I.C. of (ξ, µ + λ) at (t i , a i ) results from the D-I.C. of (ξ, µ) and the construction of λ. 8 Suppose next that e i (a i ) = e i (t i ); then η i (a i ) ≤ η i (t i ) − 1 and λ i (t i ) ≥ λ i (a i ) + K i . The W-I.C. of (ξ, µ + λ) at (t i , a i ) just results from the construction of λ:
At this point, nothing guarantees that µ + λ is feasible. λ has the particular feature that the transfers λ i to agent i only depend on his own type in T i . Hence, by a well-known procedure (see, e.g., Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1990)), one can replace λ by λ such that λ is exactly balanced (i.e., 1≤i≤n λ i (t) = 0 for every t ∈ T ) and (ξ, µ + λ ) is W-I.C.:
µ = µ + λ satisfies all our requirements, since by the exact balancedness of λ , the aggregate ex ante (W-or D-) expected payoff satisfies v(ξ, µ ) = v(ξ, µ).
Constant aggregate endowment
Several papers on implementation (Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) , Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), Serrano and Vohra (2001)) assume that the aggregate initial endowment i e i (t i ) does not depend on t, i.e., is equal to, say, e for every t ∈ T : q(t) > 0. 9 Mechanisms ξ are then defined over
Note that the above papers do not make any assumptions on a possible deposit scenario. They proceed as if e was available to the planner in the allocation game, so that in particular e can be confiscated for some reports of the agents. More precisely, they focus on deterministic mechanisms, which are thus mappings y : T → X; let us call them C-mechanisms. Such a mechanism is I.C. if
We will refer to this condition as C-I.C. It is similar to (12) , but must hold for all a i 's. On the other hand, y is a C-mechanism, defined over X whatever the reports of the agents, while the mechanisms derived from canonical equilibria of canonical D-allocation games are defined over X(a) when the agents report a.
Consider an N.T.U. economy with type-independent endowments, i.e., e i (t i ) = e i for every i, t i . In this case, one checks immediately that W-I.C. (see (5) ) is equivalent to D-I.C. (see (12) ).
This property does not extend to the case of constant aggregate endowment, as illustrated by the example of section 4, in which i e i (t i ) = 2 for every t of positive probability. We saw in section 5 that the full insurance allocation could be implemented by a D-I.C. mechanism, but could not be implemented by a W-I.C. mechanism. (14) can be viewed as a C-I.C. mechanism: for the rich types, we can proceed as before; we now have an I.C. condition for every agent when he is poor, but this is clearly satisfied.
We will show that the pattern of the example is typical: C-I.C. mechanisms are essentially equivalent to D-I.C. mechanisms. We focus on deterministic mechanisms, since C-I.C. mechanisms have been defined under that further assumption in the literature.
Proposition 8
If the aggregate initial endowment is type-independent, the set of interim expected payoffs to deterministic C-I.C. mechanisms coincides with the set of interim expected payoffs to deterministic D-I.C. mechanisms.
Proof: Let us start with a C-I.C. mechanism y. i y i (a) ≤ e for all a's, even if q(a) = 0. Let us construct y from y, as follows, for every a ∈ T :
This modifies y only on a's such that q(a) = 0, since q(a) > 0 =⇒ i e i (a i ) = e. Hence y and y yield the same interim expected payoffs. y is still C-I.C., since we lower the payoffs from y in case of deviation. y never allocates more than i e i (a i ) when the agents report a and is D-I.C. Conversely, let us consider a D-I.C. deterministic mechanism ξ, namely a mapping defined on T , such that ξ(a) ∈ X(a) for every a ∈ T , satisfying (12) . We modify ξ in order to fulfil (15) , at every a i .
ξ is a D-I.C. mechanism achieving the same interim expected payoffs as ξ. Let us show that ξ satisfies (15) . Consider agent i of type t i but claiming to be of type a i . He gets ξ i (a i , t −i ) depending on the others' types. Let t −i be such that
we must have e i (a i ) + j =i e j (t j ) = e, but since q(t −i |t i ) > 0, we also have e i (t i ) + j =i e j (t j ) = e so that e i (t i ) = e i (a i ). If the type a i claimed by agent i of type t i is such that e i (t i ) = e i (a i ), then ξ satisfies C-I.C. at t i , a i because it satisfies D-I.C. at t i , a i . Otherwise, for any t −i such that q(t −i |t i ) > 0, q(a i , t −i ) = 0 and ξ i (a i , t −i ) = 0, so that ξ also satisfies C-I.C. at t i , a i in this case.
In words: D-I.C. seems easier to fulfil than C-I.C, since one cannot pretend to be richer than one really is in D-I.C. However, under the assumption that the aggregate endowment is constant on every type profile of positive probability, a player cheating on his endowment is automatically detected if the other players tell the truth. And the planner can then confiscate the whole aggregate endowment.
Q.E.D. Remark: In the first part of the proof, we could have modified y in the same way as ξ.
compatibility conditions consist of requiring (5) for every a i ∈ T i : Vohra (1999) uses W-mechanisms but does not take into account that types are partially verifiable. He assumes that utility is −∞ outside R l + . His incentive compatibility conditions are stronger than ours.
In defining incentive compatible trading plans, Kehoe, Levine and Prescott (2000) explicitly take into account the feasibility of agents' reports. Our sets R i (t i ) typically satisfy their assumptions on sets of feasible reports (they correspond to "voluntary public endowments"). Kehoe, Levine and Prescott (2000) assume that the utility function of a given agent does not depend on other agents' types (private values) and restrict themselves on privately measurable net trades (i.e., they do not allow for mechanisms relying on all agents' reports). Furthermore, in their framework, the type dependent utility function of an agent is defined over net trades. Hence, by interpreting their utility functions in an appropriate way, their I.C. conditions can accommodate W-I.C. as well as D-I.C. As the authors make clear, "they treat sets of feasible reports as data". Unlike in the present paper, they thus do not attempt to deduce the sets of reports from a relevant version of the revelation principle.
Remark 3:
Some more elements on the choice between W-mechanisms and D-mechanisms in N.T.U. economies. As mentioned in section 3, consistency with the by now standard mechanisms in economies with type-independent endowments (or type-independent aggregate endowment) is in favor of D-mechanisms. These mechanisms ensure that a result like the non-emptiness of the ex ante I.C. core in economies satisfying N.E.I. holds even if endowments depend on types. On the other hand, Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002) used W-mechanisms in an N.T.U. example (in section 6.2), in order to illustrate the possible emptiness of the ex ante incentive compatible core in a Walrasian economy with injective type-dependent endowments (thus proving the necessity of transfers for the positive result stated as theorem 1).
Remark 4:
Participation constraints are important in mechanism design, and have perhaps been overlooked in the implementation literature (see, e.g., Palfrey (2002) ). However, we would like to separate these participation constraints from the feasibility constraints. Incentive compatibility constraints are usually conceived as feasibility constraints. It is thus disturbing that W-incentive compatibility easily generates interim individual rationality, because we may very well want to use W-I.C. mechanisms in a context where only ex ante individual rationality matters.
We mentioned in the introduction Hong's extensions of the results on Bayesian implementation ( [5] , [15] , [17] , etc.) to economies with type-dependent endowments, or adopting another point of view, of [12] from Nash to Bayesian implementation (see [9] and [10] ). Using our terminilogy, Hong relied on W-I.C. mechanisms which are not necessarily int.I.R., an approach which may be discutable, as we showed.
